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Filed 1/9/09
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EDITH ANN BOWERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
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F054686
(Super. Ct. No. MCR08613)
OPINION |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior
Court of Madera County. Eric C. Wyatt, Judge.
Peggy A. Headley, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell,
Assistant Attorney General, Brian Alvarez and Leanne LeMon, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
In December 2001, defendant Edith Ann
Bowers was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of two counts of
battery on correctional officers. (Pen. Code, § 4501.5.)
The court committed Bowers to the Department of Mental Health (DMH). In
2005, after waiver of a jury trial, Bowers’s commitment was extended to
August 16, 2007. We affirmed the order extending Bowers’s commitment in
People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870 (Bowers).
On May 8, 2007,
Bowers was conditionally released to the Central California Conditional
Release Program (CONREP) for outpatient treatment and supervision. In
October 2007, CONREP requested Bowers’s outpatient status be revoked
because she violated the terms and conditions of her release. The court
remanded Bowers into the custody of the Madera County Department of
Corrections pending a hearing on CONREP’s request.
A petition for extended commitment
under section 1026.5, subdivision (b) was filed on December 4 alleging
that Bowers continued to possess a mental disease, defect or disorder,
and by reason of such mental disease, defect, or disorder, represented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. The petition was based
on an attached declaration from Jeffrey Zwerin, D.O., Medical Director
at Napa State Hospital (NSH), which incorporated a March 5 hospital case
summary.
At the December 13 trial confirmation
hearing, Bowers’s counsel informed the court she wanted to “waive her
right to a hearing.” The court explained what that meant: “In this
case it would be a jury trial on an extended commitment and agree to an
extended commitment and being sent back to Patton for a period of two
years.” Bowers responded, “Yes.” The court took Bowers’s waiver of her
right to a jury trial, in which her counsel joined. The court asked
defense counsel whether “in this case is it going to be by means of
submission on the reports or is it going to be by stipulation to the
findings that by reason of mental disease, defect or disorder, Miss
Bowers represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others?”
Defense counsel responded, “Stipulation of the reports I believe, Your
Honor.” The court explained it would mark as Exhibit 1 “for purposes of
what would be a Court trial, instead of a jury trial, the report that
was filed by Mr. Duarte. And based upon that you understand having read
that, I will make the findings as indicated and I will extend your
commitment for a period of two years? Okay.” Bowers acknowledged that
she understood that. The parties stipulated to the admission of a
November 16 report by CONREP’s community program director, Mark L.
Duarte, and its primary clinician/designee Shannon M. Parkinson. Dr.
Zwerin’s report also was admitted as evidence. The attorneys submitted
the matter and “[b]ased upon those reports[,]” the court found by reason
of mental disease, defect or disorder Bowers represented a substantial
danger of physical harm to others. The court consequently extended her
commitment for two years.
The court prepared a written order,
which stated that Bowers had agreed to have “the matter determined by
the court instead of by means of a jury trial,” the parties stipulated
the court could admit the two reports into evidence, and “[t]he case was
then submitted to the court for decision by the attorneys for both
parties.” The order further stated that having received the evidence
and considered the arguments, the court made factual findings and
orders, including that it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bowers continues to suffer from a mental disease, defect or disorder and
as a result, she represents a substantial danger of physical harm to
others and has serious difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior.
Finally, the order stated Bowers’s prior commitment was extended to
December 23, 2009.
On appeal, Bowers contends the order
extending her commitment violated due process as the evidence was
insufficient to prove that she was a danger to others and could not
control her dangerous behavior. The People assert the issue is waived
because she stipulated to her recommitment, and even if not waived,
substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. As we shall
explain, we disagree that the issue is waived, but agree substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings.
FACTS
The DMH Report
Dr. Zwerin stated in his affidavit that
he had reviewed Bowers’s case and in his opinion, she qualified for
extension of her commitment under section 1026.5, in that in her present
status and condition, by reason of a mental disease, defect or disorder,
Bowers represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others.
Based on this, Dr. Zwerin recommended application to the court for an
extension of Bowers’s commitment. Dr. Zwerin stated his opinion and
recommendation were supported by the “recent hospital case summary,”
which was attached and incorporated by reference.
The hospital case summary, dated March
5, was prepared by a team of five DMH staff members, which included a
psychiatrist, a medical doctor, a social worker and a psychologist. The
summary related the following information. Bowers, who was 43 years
old, had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, depressed type,
alcohol dependence (in institutional remission), and borderline
personality disorder. Bowers was committed after attacking a social
worker during a counseling session by attempting to hit him with a table
and then grabbing him, making contact with his face and tearing the
pocket off of his shirt; when correctional officers intervened, she
kicked an officer’s hand into the wall, jamming his thumb. Bowers has a
criminal record that includes three convictions for section 452 and 451,
subdivision (d), arson of property/forest land. Bowers stated “she must
set fires, ‘because the voices tell me to do it and I am helping the
country by setting the fires.’” Bowers also has a history of periodic
hallucinations commanding her to engage in dangerous acts under the
threat of death. Bowers has been hospitalized 26 times for psychiatric
reasons, the first time when she was 14 following her first suicide
attempt. Bowers has attempted suicide numerous times and reports
chronic suicidal ideation, depression, paranoia, and anxiety.
The focus of treatment was to help
Bowers gain a better understanding of her mental illness, including its
triggers and warnings, in order to develop a comprehensive wellness and
recovery plan, which must also adequately address her alcohol
dependence. She had progressed over the past six months, as she had
remained on the open unit and was attending her assigned groups. Bowers
usually adhered to hospital expectations, but at times needed to be
reminded of unacceptable behaviors. Although she was less needy, she
had periods in which she exhibited a variety of complaints as a way to
seek staff attention. She remained free of violence and had not acted
in a self-injurious manner over the past six months. Bowers had been
largely free of symptoms of psychosis, took her medications willingly,
and denied any untoward side effects. Her understanding of her mental
illness had improved slightly and she had begun to work on her wellness
and recovery plan, which would require “considerable work to be
adequately completed.” The team was concerned that Bowers did not
acknowledge alcohol as being problematic despite having been diagnosed
with alcohol dependence. The team noted that because of her denial, she
had not addressed the issue in her plan, which would be considered
incomplete until she did so, and that her health issues, which included
hyperthyroidism, morbid obesity and chronic cigarette smoking, could
impact her mental health status. In the team’s opinion Bowers, by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder, represented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others, and therefore the team
recommended extension of her commitment.
The CONREP Report
The CONREP report was prepared by
CONREP primary clinician Shannon M. Parkinson, MSW, ACSW, and signed by
CONREP community program director Mark L. Duarte, MSW, LCSW. The report
relayed the following information. Bowers was diagnosed with borderline
personality disorder when she was 13 years old; she subsequently was
admitted to the children’s program at Napa State Hospital. When she was
16, Bowers ran away from the hospital several times and eventually was
transferred to a locked ward at the hospital before being released to
her conservator’s custody pending community placement. Bowers was
readmitted to Napa State Hospital when she was 17 after taking 20 cold
capsules, and released a month later. After that, Bowers moved in with
an older man. During the 17 years she lived with him, she reportedly
had 26 psychiatric hospitalizations and attempted to kill herself 12
times by overdosing on pills or cutting herself. Bowers’s current
diagnoses included schizoaffective disorder, depressed type, alcohol
dependence, and borderline personality disorder.
On November 16, 2000,
Bowers, who was serving a prison sentence for arson, became upset during
a counseling session with the prison psychological social worker and the
student intern. When prison officers tried to intervene, Bowers
attempted to hit them in the face with a table and then made contact
with one officer’s face, tore the pocket off his shirt, and pulled him
to the ground. Bowers began flailing and kicking the officers, causing
injury to an officer’s thumb. According to Bowers’s statements
following the incident, she had been suffering from considerable
hallucinations and voices tormenting her. She did not completely recall
the attack, but did remember telling the prison psychiatrist she needed
her medications changed and that she became very upset when her request
was refused. Bowers stated at the time that if they had listened to
her, “‘none of this would have happened.’”
When this offense occurred, Bowers was
incarcerated for a September 1999 arson, in which she started two grass
fires, three trashcan fires, and set fire to a mailbox. Witnesses
observed Bowers igniting newspapers with a cigarette lighter and
throwing them into trashcans and grassy lots. Bowers stated she set
fires “‘because the voices tell me to do it and I am helping the country
by setting fires.’” Prior to this offense, Bowers was arrested in
November 1996 for starting a fire in a dumpster. In that case, Bowers
pled no contest to unlawfully causing a fire of property, a violation of
section 452, subdivision (d). Bowers told her probation officer she did
not recall having started the fire and she “‘had a few drinks after an
officer had raped her in the Sacramento County Jail.’” Bowers further
alleged the officer had “‘sexually abused her’ in August 1996 and that
she was afraid he would hurt her because he had allegedly been ‘stalking
her for some time.’”
Bowers’s problems were identified as
substance or alcohol abuse, withdrawing and failing to disclose
information to the clinician or staff, a history of co-dependent
behaviors that lead to added stress, behaviors that lead to mistrust
between Bowers, peers and her therapist, and difficulties in
interpersonal relationships that lead to negative situations including
suicide attempts and/or criminal behavior. Bowers’s precursors were
identified as any failure of interpersonal relationships, any alcohol
and substance abuse, increased paranoid delusional thinking lasting
longer than one hour, auditory or visual hallucinations lasting longer
than one hour, increase in agitation, lying, or hypo-manic behavior
lasting more than 30 minutes, and isolative behavior lasting longer than
12 hours. Treatment goals included return to Napa State Hospital for
further evaluation and treatment, developing commitment to sobriety, and
demonstrating personal responsibility for the consequences of her
actions.
After Bowers’s release to
CONREP on May 8, she had numerous contacts with both law enforcement and
emergency room staff, and failed to comply with the program. Her first
incident of non-compliance occurred on June 7, when she consumed alcohol
and called 911 because she felt as if she wanted to hurt herself. She
was taken to the emergency room, checked out, and released. On
September 12, Bowers failed to check in with CONREP as required and left
Fresno County without permission or notifying CONREP. Bowers contacted
CONREP on September 15, but would not reveal her whereabouts. Bowers
was found to be in a locked acute psychiatric ward in San Jose. She
reported that after becoming upset with the CONREP program director she
took the train to Oakland, where she called 911 due to suicidal
feelings. The police took her to the psychiatric facility in San Jose,
where she was admitted. Bowers was returned to CONREP, put on program
probation, and notified that if she broke her terms and conditions again
revocation would be recommended.
On September 27, Bowers
went to a hospital emergency room where she reported that a peer from
CONREP had raped her. The hospital notified both the police and CONREP.
Bowers told police, her therapist and the CONREP program director that
she had gone to a peer’s house, talked with him a little, and asked him
for a soda. She claimed that after he brought her a soda, he began
slapping her hard on her left shoulder, pushed her to the ground, pulled
off her pants and underwear, and raped her. The man did not say
anything to her during the entire incident and let her walk out of the
house afterwards. Bowers said she then drank three 24-ounce beers she
bought at a convenience store, and went to the emergency room, where she
called the CONREP program director and told him she wanted to kill
herself. The program director calmed her down. Bowers said she would
be fine for the night and promised to check in with him and her
clinician first thing in the morning. The next morning, Bowers left her
apartment, telling her roommate she was going to the CONREP office.
Instead, she bought one more 24-ounce beer, drank it, wandered around
downtown Fresno, and then went to the emergency room, where she reported
she had been raped.
The police officer
investigating the alleged rape, a CONREP clinician and the CONREP
program director spoke with the man Bowers accused of the rape. The man
had an alibi and agreed to submit to DNA testing. Bowers did not have
any bruises or marks. Her underwear, which she said would have DNA
evidence, was not found in her room where she said it was. The police
officer reported that since there was no evidence Bowers had been raped,
he would await the results of the sexual assault kit and proceed from
there. At the time of the report, there was no evidence to substantiate
Bowers’s allegation. While in the emergency room awaiting a sexual
assault exam, Bowers ingested her entire six-day medication supply. She
was given charcoal and kept overnight for her medication levels to be
monitored. She was then admitted to the acute inpatient psychiatric
unit at Community Behavioral Center because she reported suicidal
feelings.
In the opinion of
Parkinson and Duarte, Bowers was not managing to live in the community
lawfully with supervision, structure and support by peers and staff, and
had shown she was a danger to herself and others. She inappropriately
utilized community resources by frequenting the local emergency room and
community psychiatric units instead of discussing her problems with her
clinician and CONREP. The report noted Bowers consumes alcohol
“reporting that she ‘doesn’t care’ about the consequences.” Although
Bowers had made numerous suicide threats and attempts, she refused to
talk about her feelings relating to these in her therapy sessions.
Bowers continued to break the terms and conditions of outpatient
treatment and supervision with no obvious thought to the consequences.
When asked why she did so, she always responded, “‘I don’t know.’”
According to Parkinson
and Duarte, Bowers is “very easily disturbed and acts out in self
destructive and dangerous ways.” She responds well to external control
and is in need of a secure treatment facility to regain her equilibrium
before returning to the community. They opined that Bowers lacked the
insight and skill to navigate the stresses of daily living in the
community lawfully, and she did not evidence any actual control of her
behavior when on her own. They believed Bowers had been engaging in
increasingly dangerous behavior. Bowers had demonstrated her
willingness “to say and do whatever she wants, when she wants, and does
this to assuage her loneliness and boredom for which she has little
insight into more constructive ways to get her needs met.” They stated
that Bowers was evidencing self defeating behaviors, which included
extreme mood swings, self injurious acts, obsession with others and
making false accusations about others without provocation. These
behaviors were “escalating in dangerousness as evidenced by lack of self
worth and inability to utilize resources appropriately, and making
serious [unsubstantiated] allegations against others . . .”. Although
Bowers was capable of learning how to modulate her behavior, she needed
to exercise the will to authentically apply herself to sobriety and
treat herself with value.
In Parkinson’s and
Duarte’s clinical judgment, Bowers was a danger to herself and others
“by her erratic, manipulative, maladaptive behavior which is
increasingly high risk.” Consequently, they opined Bowers was in need
of an extension of her commitment to give adequate time for a continuity
of care, without which Bowers would “pose a danger in the community
because of her maladaptive attention seeking and self injurious
behavior.”
DISCUSSION
Bowers argues that although the
evidence may have shown she was a danger to herself, it did not prove
she posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others
or that she had serious difficulty controlling behavior that was
dangerous to others. Under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity is subject to extended
commitments, beyond the maximum period of penal confinement, if “by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder[, the person] represents
a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” In addition, there
must be proof that a person subject to commitment has “serious
difficulty in controlling . . . dangerous behavior.” (Bowers,
supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 878; see also People v. Galindo
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 531, 536.)
“‘Whether a defendant “by reason of a
mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of
physical harm to others” under section 1026.5 is a question of fact to
be resolved with the assistance of expert testimony.’ [Citation.] ‘In
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a section 1026.5
extension, we apply the test used to review a judgment of conviction;
therefore, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to
the extension order to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the requirements of section 1026.5(b)(1) beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Crosswhite (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
494, 507-508 (Crosswhite).) “A single psychiatric opinion that
an individual is dangerous because of a mental disease constitutes
substantial evidence to support an extension of the defendant’s
commitment under section 1026.5.” (Bowers, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 879.)
We first address the People’s assertion
that Bowers’s substantial evidence claim is waived. The People contend
the record shows that Bowers stipulated to her recommitment and
therefore she cannot now claim there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s findings. In support of this contention, the
People rely on Crosswhite, in which the appellate court concluded
the defendant waived any contention there was not substantial evidence
to support the finding that he continued to pose a substantial physical
danger to others where he withdrew his request for trial and conceded he
fell within the provisions of section 1026 for recommitment, which
stipulation the trial court accepted. (Crosswhite, supra,
101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 500, 507.)
Crosswhite is inapplicable here
because Bowers did not stipulate to her recommitment. Instead, the
record shows that defense counsel submitted the matter on the reports.
The court’s written order specifically states that Bowers agreed to have
the matter determined by the court, the two reports were received into
evidence, and the case was then submitted to the court for decision,
after which the court made the factual findings necessary to support
recommitment. As Bowers points out, in such instances a sufficiency of
the evidence claim is not waived. (Cf. Bunnell v. Superior Court
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604 [defendant who submits case on the transcript
preserved his right to argue on appeal sufficiency of the evidence].)
Bowers’s claim fails, however, because
sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings. By the
parties’ agreement, the only evidence presented at the extension hearing
was the reports of Dr. Zwerin, which incorporated a case summary
prepared in March 2007, and Parkinson and Duarte of CONREP. Both
reports noted that Bowers had a long history of chronic mental illness.
Specifically, Bowers suffers from schizoaffective disorder which caused
her to suffer auditory hallucinations which commanded her to hurt
herself or others. These hallucinations appeared to have been under
control, as Bowers was released to CONREP, an outpatient program.
Bowers, however, was unable to comply with the terms and conditions of
CONREP — she failed to keep CONREP apprised of her whereabouts, left the
county, drank alcohol, attempted suicide at least twice, and used the
local emergency room and community psychiatric units instead of
discussing her problems with CONREP. Bowers’s actions while in CONREP
show that she was unable to control her behavior. As stated in the
CONREP report, Bowers was willing to say and do whatever she wanted,
whenever she wanted, with little insight into more constructive ways of
getting her needs met and without regard to the consequences of her
actions. Bowers admitted she did not know why she continued to break
the terms and conditions of outpatient treatment and that she consumed
alcohol without regard to the consequences. This evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that Bowers had serious difficulty controlling her
behavior.
Bowers contends there are no facts to
show either that her behavior was dangerous or that she posed a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. She ignores, however,
her past history of assault and arsons. Although Bowers did not engage
in these acts while in outpatient treatment, the evidence shows her
behavior in the community escalating in seriousness and dangerousness —
from consuming alcohol, to suicide attempts, to making unsubstantiated
accusations of criminal behavior by another person. Given her history,
which included physically attacking prison personnel and starting fires,
and her inability to control her behavior while in a community setting,
the CONREP social workers reasonably could conclude, as they did, that
Bowers presented a substantial danger of physical harm to others should
she remain in the community, as it was only a matter of time before her
behavior escalated to the point of physically harming others.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
_____________________
Gomes, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Vartabedian, Acting P. J.
_____________________
Cornell, J.

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