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■ People v. Bryant, No. B205295

I.  INTRODUCTION

            Defendant was committed to the state hospital pursuant to Penal Code[1] section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(B).  On May 21, 2007, two psychiatrists, a psychologist, and a program assistant at Patton State Hospital signed a report prepared pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (b)(1).  The report recommended defendant be returned to superior court as he was competent to stand.  However, it was not until more than two months later on July 27, 2007, pursuant to section 1372, subdivision (a)(1), that the designee of the medical director at Patton State Hospital certified defendant was competent to stand trial.  Normally, an accused is not entitled to section 4019 presentence conduct credits for time spent in the state mental hospital against a subsequent sentence.  This is because the period of confinement while the accused is hospitalized is not considered punitive.  Here, we discuss when defendant became entitled to conduct credits—on May 21, 2007 when the hospital staff unanimously reported he was competent to stand trial or later on July 27, 2007, when the section 1372, subdivision (a)(1) medical certification was mailed to the trial court.  In light of the uncontradicted evidence defendant was competent as of May 21, 2007, he is entitled to conduct credits from that date against the sentence imposed after he was found in violation of a grant of probation. 

III.  DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CONDUCT CREDITS FROM MAY 21, 2007

            Defendant argues he is entitled to conduct credits from May 21, 2007—the date of the first report sent to Judge Egerton attesting to his competency to stand trial.  Typically, an accused awaiting trial is not statutorily entitled to conduct credits for time spent in a state hospital while subject to a finding of incompetency.  (People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 569; People v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 502-503.)  However, our Supreme Court has explained that the Courts of Appeal have held equal protection principles may require a pretrial detainee receive conduct credits for time spent in a nonpenal facility:  “Section 4019 provides that its formula for good behavior credit applies to persons detained, prior to felony sentencing, in specifically enumerated local facilities, including  ‘county jail[s], industrial farm[s], or road camp[s] or . . . city jail[s], industrial farm[s], or road camp[s].’  (Id., subd. (a)(4), italics added.)  The statute does not apply to presentence time spent receiving treatment ‘in [such] nonpenal institutions . . . as state hospitals.’  (People v. Sage[, supra,] 26 Cal.3d 498[ at pp. 502-503].)  However, it has been held that equal protection requires application of section 4019 credits to presentence confinement in a state facility if the circumstances of the confinement are essentially penal.  (See People v. Guzman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 691, 693-695 [person diverted, prior to sentencing, for treatment at California Rehabilitation Center (CRC), but later excluded from CRC as unsuitable, is entitled to § 4019 credits while thereafter still confined at CRC pending sentencing]; see also People v. Nubla (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 719, 731.)”  (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 30, fn. 6.) 

            The two decisions cited in Buckhalter by our Supreme Court as examples of when equal protection principles may warrant granting conduct credits where they may otherwise may be not be available, People v. Guzman, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pages 693-695 and People v. Nubla, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at page 731, are instructive in the context of this case.  In Guzman, the defendant was excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center on June 1994.  But the staff at the California Rehabilitation failed to notify the trial court of the exclusion order until August 1994.  (People v. Guzman, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 694.)  As in our case, a patient at the California Rehabilitation Center is not entitled to presentence conduct credits.  Based on equal protection principles, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant was entitled to conduct credits from the date of exclusion from the California Rehabilitation Center.  The Court of Appeal reasoned:  the rationale for denying conduct credits for time spent in nonpenal institutions is those being treated in such facilities have their own incentives for good behavior; a person who has been excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center, but remains housed there, has no incentive for good behavior apart from the allowance of conduct credit; and the state’s concern in encouraging good behavior by a person excluded from the California  Rehabilitation Center is identical to its interest in encouraging good behavior on the part of unsentenced county jail inmates.  (Id. at p. 695.) 

■ HELD:

Trial court judgment is affirmed and the sentence modified where defendant is entitled to Penal Code section 4019 presentence conduct credits from the date the hospital staff reported he was competent to stand trial even though the Penal Code section 1372 (a)(1) medical certification has not been mailed to the trial court, as the evidence demonstrated defendant's competency was unquestionably regained as of that date.
People v. Bryant -B205295-5/22/09 CA2/5
People v. Bryant -B205295-5/22/09 CA2/5-PDF

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