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California Supreme And Appellate Court
Case Summaries
Evidence Expert Testimony Law
EVIDENCE EXPERT TESTIMONY LAW
Evidence-Expert Testimony Law Case Summaries
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Maatuuk v. Guttman , No.
B200675
Facts
Respondent represented Maatuk, a mechanical engineer, in
litigation which resulted in the invalidation of two patents which
Maatuk had obtained for a liquid level sensor. This legal malpractice
case followed. In this case, the jury was instructed that respondent
was negligent in his representation of Maatuk. On special verdicts, the
jury found negligence and that respondent had breached his fiduciary
duty.
The jury also found that the breach of duty was a substantial factor in
causing harm or monetary damage to Maatuk, and made the same finding
about respondent's negligence.
On damages, the jury was asked "What are Dr. Josef Maatuk's monetary
damages? a. Past and Future Lost Earnings?" The jury answered "$0.00."
The question
on appeal concerns damages, more specifically, the trial court's order
striking the testimony of Maatuk's damages expert, Dr. Barbara Luna.
Our summary of the facts is directed toward that issue:
Maatuk
expected to profit from his invention through a licensing agreement
through which he would earn a royalty on each sale.
He presented
evidence that his sensor worked, or could be made to work, could be
built from readily available components at the commercially attractive
price of $2, was attractive to industry because it had no moving parts
and was multi-functional, and that it had many commercial applications.
He presented evidence that, for instance, in a car, his sensor could
measure fuel level, density, and vapor leakage; engine oil density and
level; coolant level and quality; windshield wiper fluid level; and
transmission fluid viscosity and level. Thus, five of his sensors could
be used in a car. Car manufacturers would pay $7 for each. A pleasure
boat could use the sensors for fuel level, water level, and septic tank
height, at $40 per sensor.
This evidence
was in large part through his own testimony. For instance, the only
evidence that the sensor could be manufactured for $2 was his testimony,
as was the only evidence on the number of sensors which could be placed
in a car or boat, etc., and the price which could be charged, though
Maatuk's enablement
expert, Alberto Schroth, testified that the sensor could be built from
readily available components and had commercial application for use in
transmissions, batteries, compressors, commercial washing machines,
etc., and that the sensor was attractive because it had no moving parts.
Much of
Maatuk's evidence concerned commercial interest in his technology. The
patents, which he obtained in 1998 and 1999, were invalidated in 2002.
He presented evidence that in 1996, he entered into an agreement with
Kysor Medallion, under which Kysor Medallion would test the technology
and fund development of the probe, a critical part of the sensor. In
1997, he entered into an agreement with Therm-O-Disc, the other party to
the patent litigation. Therm-O-Disc would test the sensor and if the
tests were successful, license and manufacture the device. When the
patent litigation was filed, in 2000, he was discussing funding for "productization,"
validation, and testing of the technology with the Robert Bosch
Corporation. There was also interest from Tedesco Vickers, Navistar,
Visteon, and Walbro. Maatuk's evidence was that Kysor-Medallion's and
Therm-O-Disc's tests showed that the device worked within the
specifications set out for the development phase, and that any problems
were easily fixable.
On damages,
Maatuk testified that the patents were worth $12 million, based on the
fact that Bosch was interested in funding "commercialization" of the
device, and that Bosch had a 20 percent market share and would pay a
three percent royalty. The jury was instructed that he was testifying
as a lay witness, not as an expert. Maatuk also testified that after
the first two patents were invalidated, the value of his remaining
technology was reduced. Everyone could go back to his earlier
technology, modify it, and get a patent.
Dr. Luna,
Maatuk's expert witness on damages, was a CPA and business appraiser
with experience in valuing patents. She calculated lost royalties
between 2003, the year after the patents were invalidated, and 2014,
reasoning that each patent had a 20 year life dating from the 1995
patent application. Based on assumptions on the royalty rate, number of
units (that is, cars or boats, etc.) manufactured each year, the number
of sensors which would be placed in each unit, the price which would be
charged for each sensor, and the market penetration Maatuk's sensor
would achieve, she concluded that Maatuk's lost royalties had a present
value of between $17.6 million and $205.3 million.
Luna's
assumption on the number of units manufactured was based on published
statistical information. The royalty rate, three percent, was based on
a published database and on the documents in this case. The assumptions
about number of sensors which could be placed in each unit, cost to
manufacture, and the price which could be charged, she learned from
Maatuk, a consultant, Fred Beegle, who worked with Maatuk in the Bosch
discussions, and in some instances from other depositions in this case.
The assumption about market penetration was based on conversations with
Maatuk and Beegle, and was that Maatuk's sensor would have five percent
of each market in 2003, building to 50 percent in certain markets and to
25 percent in other markets.
Respondent's
evidence was that Maatuk did not suffer any damages from the loss of his
patents, because he never had a product to sell. He had an idea, but no
product.
Respondent's
experts testified that the Kysor Medallion and Therm-O-Disc test results
showed that the sensor did not work, and respondent emphasized the fact
no one had actually licensed the technology. Instead, each manufacturer
who expressed interest quickly lost interest. For instance, Kysor
Medallion, which had agreed to pay $70,000 to "productize" the probe to
a specified degree of accuracy and to pay additional sums for future
phases of development, made an initial payment of $35,000, and a second
payment of $18,000, and refused to pay any more. The matter went to
arbitration, which did not result in an order that Kysor Medallion make
an additional payment.
Therm-O-Disc, too, refused to license the technology, but instead took
out its own patent, disclosing one of Maatuk's patents as prior art.
Maatuk had
entered into evidence the report of a Bosch engineer, emphasizing the
portion which said that the sensor "has the potential to sense the level
of other fluids such as engine oil, transmission fluid, windshield
washer fluid . . . ." The defense emphasized the conclusion that ". . .
though the basic function was demonstrated, it is unclear whether a
commercially viable product would meet the requirements of an automotive
fuel delivery system, etc. . . ."
Another
defense expert, Dr. Gary Cochran, a physicist with experience in the
automotive industry in design, and in manufacturing costs, testified
that the Kysor Medallion test results showed problems which were
consistent with the problems he saw in the device as described in the
patents.
Respondent
also called, for instance, Alexander Strozer, an engineer at Magneti
Marelli, which manufactures parts for the boat, automotive, and
motorcycle industries. In 2004 or 2005, Strozer looked at data Maatuk
supplied and tested prototypes of Maatuk's probe. He found accuracy
problems, and no visible progress since the Kysor Medallion tests.
Strozer believed that Maatuk had had enough time to work on the
problems, and that given that he hadn't solved them, he would not be
able to solve them in a year, which was what Magneti needed. The
technology was "too far from a product," and was more of a concept.
Strozer also testified that Maatuk did not have the kind of professional
approach to testing which would allow Magneti Marelli to partner with
him in developing the sensor. A former employee of Vickers Tedesco
testified that Vickers Tedesco had at one point found Maatuk's
technology interesting, but did not move forward because Maatuk had no
working product.
On
cross-examination of Fred Beegle, respondent elicited the testimony that
Maatuk had claimed that the sensor had one percent accuracy, but that
there was no evidence to support the claim, and that as far as Beegle
knew, no one had ever made Maatuk's technology work.
Cochran also
testified, as an expert, on the cost to mass produce the device
described in Maatuk's patents, which he put at $18 a device. The
technology then in use cost between $2.50 and $3 a device. Boat
manufactures paid no more than $8 for a liquid level sensor. Coolant
levels were currently measured by a micro switch on a float, which cost
about 50 cents to manufacture. Oil was measured with a dipstick, which
cost about the same. There was only one liquid level sensor in a car.
No car manufacturer in the world used five liquid level sensors. The
same was true of trucks. He himself had patented, and licensed, a
liquid level sensor. The price point it had to meet was $3. Cochran
opined that even if Maatuk's technology could be made to work, it would
have no value to the marine or automotive industries because it was cost
prohibitive.
After the
close of evidence, respondent moved for nonsuit. The court denied that
motion, but after additional argument, and a motion by respondent, the
court struck Luna's testimony, finding that there was no basis for her
assumption concerning market penetration or her other assumptions,
noting in particular the the disparity between the undisputed evidence
that Maatuk had earned essentially nothing from his technology before
the patents were invalidated, and Luna's assumption of five percent
market share in many markets, the year after the patents were
invalidated. The court found that evidence was that "you are not going
to have any share of the market. He has got no product" and "no working
application of any kind." The court described Luna's testimony as "an
entirely theoretical construct completely abstracted from any reality."
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HELD:
In a legal malpractice action, trial court judgment
is affirmed where the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the
testimony of plaintiff's damages expert as there was not a sufficient
foundation for the expert's assumptions on market penetration and on her
underlying assumption that plaintiff had a product to sell.
Maatuk v. Guttman
-B200675-3/27/09 CA2/5

Maatuk v. Guttman
-B200675-3/27/09 CA2/5-pdf

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