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California Supreme And Appellate Court
Case Summaries
Evidence-Hearsay Law
EVIDENCE -HEARSAY LAW
Evidence-Hearsay Law Case Summaries
■ Jazayeri v. Mao, No. B195083
A.
Copies of Altered PCCs Obtained From Susan Mao
Documents
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted are, by definition, not
hearsay. Hearsay is defined in section 1200 as “evidence of a statement
that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” Where
“‘the very fact in controversy is whether certain things were said or
done and not . . . whether these things were true or false, . . . in
these cases the words or acts are admissible not as hearsay[,] but as
original evidence.’” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, §
31, p. 714, quoting People v. Henry (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 785,
789.) For example, documents containing operative facts, such as the
words forming an agreement, are not hearsay. (People v. Jimenez
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 795, 802; People v. Dell (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 248, 261-262.) The operative facts rule also applies in an
action for fraud. (1 Witkin, supra, Hearsay, § 33, p. 715 [“In
an action for . . . deceit, the words spoken, written, or printed may be
proved”]; see People v. Dell, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p.
258 [words spoken by defendant to solicit prostitution are operative
facts or “‘verbal acts’”].)
Appellants
offered the altered PCCs given them by Susan Mao not for the truth of
the matter asserted -- that the inscribed number of chickens were DOA or
condemned by the USDA inspectors -- but as direct evidence of the
fraudulent statements made to appellants by respondents. The evidence
supported that respondents used the altered PCCs to induce appellants to
believe that a greater number of chickens delivered by R&A Ranch to Mao
Foods were DOA or condemned than was actually the case, and to accept
payments of less than the amount due. “[T]his is a typical example of
the nonhearsay use of an extrajudicial statement ‘to prove, as relevant
to a disputed fact in an action, that the . . . hearer . . . obtained
certain information by hearing . . . the statement and, believing such
information to be true, acted in conformity with such belief.’
[Citation.]” (Holland v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 940, 947, quoting 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d
ed. 1982) Hearsay & Nonhearsay, § 1.4, p. 57, italics omitted.) Here,
appellants accepted inadequate payment for the chickens sold to Mao
Foods in reliance on the allegedly false representations of Susan Mao.
B.
Copies of PCCs Obtained From the USDA
1. Admissibility As Official Record under Section 1280
Section
1280 makes admissible a writing that records an act, condition, or event
if “(a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public
employee[;] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act,
condition, or event[;] and (c) The sources of information and method and
time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” This
exception to the hearsay rule is based on the presumption that public
officers properly perform their official duties. As the court explained
in Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d
72: “‘When it is a part of the duty of a public officer to make a
statement as to a fact coming within his official cognizance, the great
probability is that he does his duty and makes a correct statement
. . . . The fundamental circumstance is that an official duty exists to
make an accurate statement, and that this special and weighty duty will
usually suffice as a motive to incite the officer to its fulfillment
. . . . It is the influence of the official duty, broadly considered,
which is taken as the sufficient element of trustworthiness, justifying
the acceptance of the hearsay statement.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 78-79, quoting 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974) §
1632, p. 618, italics omitted.)
“The object
of [the section 1280] hearsay exception ‘is to eliminate the calling of
each witness involved in preparation of the record and substitute the
record of the transaction instead. [Citations.]’” (Gananian v.
Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 634, 639, quoting County of Sonoma v.
Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 1439, 1451.) “Accordingly, for the
exception to apply, ‘[i]t is not necessary that the person making the
entry have personal knowledge of the transaction. [Citations.]’” (Gananian,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 639-640, quoting Loper v.
Morrison (1944) 23 Cal.2d 600, 609.) “Assuming satisfaction of the
exception’s other requirements, ‘[t]he trustworthiness requirement
. . . is established by a showing that the written report is based upon
the observations of public employees who have a duty to observe
the facts and report and record them correctly.’” (Gananian,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 640, quoting People v. Baeske
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 775, 780, original italics.)
That PCCs
fall within the official records exception to the hearsay rule is beyond
dispute. Similar documents were at issue in Imperial Cattle Co. v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 263, disapproved in
part on other grounds in Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 432 where the plaintiff introduced into evidence USDA
cattle condemnation certificates to establish the number of its cattle
that had contracted disease as the result of the defendant’s
negligence. On appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s contention
that the certificates were inadmissible hearsay: “The condemnation
certificates appear to fall clearly within the ‘official records’
exception to the hearsay rule. . . . The record demonstrates that
condemnation certificates are prepared by veterinarians employed by the
federal government following an inspection of each cattle carcass if the
veterinarian determines that the meat is infected with measles. Such
evidence not only satisfies the first two predicates to the invocation
of section 1280 but also indicates the basic trustworthiness of the
documents.” (Imperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.,
supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 272.)
Here, too,
the record establishes that Dr. Millare and his staff prepared the PCCs
after inspection of each chicken delivered. The inspectors gathered the
information as the chickens were being processed, kept a total for each
category on their tally sheets, and transferred the final numbers to the
PCCs before the end of the day. Dr. Millare testified that he and the
USDA inspectors he supervised prepared the forms in order to gather
disease information on the chickens, and that the information from the
PCCs is kept on computer files for USDA’s records. The fact that one of
the relevant numbers on the PCCs -- the DOA number -- was obtained and
filled in by Mao Foods employees does not render the remainder of the
information any less an official record.
The court’s
basis for rejecting the PCCs Jazayeri offered into evidence as true and
correct copies of the the USDA originals in order to establish the true
number of DOA and condemned chickens is not entirely clear. The court
appeared to agree with respondents’ counsel that appellants had not
proven the documents were official records because Dr. Millare, who
testified as to the manner of their preparation, was not their
custodian. However, Dr. Millare was the custodian of the PCCs
generated at the Mao Foods plant. He testified that he kept all the
USDA originals in a locked cabinet in his office. With respect to the
particular PCCs involved here, Dr. Millare was directed to mail them to
the USDA’s Washington, D.C. FOIA office so that a response to
appellants’ FOIA request could be prepared. The FOIA office faxed back
to him copies of the documents he had provided. Moreover, unlike the
business records exception, the official records exception does not
require “the custodian or other qualified witness” to testify in order
to establish admissibility as an official record. (Cf. § 1280, with
§ 1271.)
Dr. Millare’s testimony established his personal knowledge that the PCCs
were made “by and within the scope of duty of a public employee . . . at
or near the time of the act, condition, or event,” and that the “sources
of information and method and time of preparation were such as to
indicate [their] trustworthiness.” That is all that section 1280
requires.
The general
rule with respect to documents offered under an exception to the hearsay
rule is that the party offering the documents bears the burden of
establishing the foundational requirement of trustworthiness. (People
v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1011.) The trial court has
“broad discretion in determining whether a sufficient foundation has
been laid” and “we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on such a
foundational question only if the court clearly abused its discretion.”
(Ibid.) Here, it does not appear that the trial court concluded
the foundational requirements of section 1280 had not been met; it
appears rather that the court misunderstood what those foundational
requirements were. Accordingly, we review the ruling excluding the PCCs
de novo. Under that standard, the court’s ruling was error.
Jazayeri v. Mao -B195083- 5/27/09 CA2/4

Jazayeri v. Mao -B195083- 5/27/09 CA2/4
■
HELD:
In a breach of
contract and fraud action, trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's
documentary evidence and judgment in favor of defendant is reversed
where: 1) altered poultry condemnation certificates were authenticated
and were not hearsay as they were introduced as the operative
documents establishing the fraud perpetrated on plaintiff; 2) the
unaltered certificates obtained from the USDA were properly
authenticated and admissible as official records; 3) the purchase
orders were properly authenticated and admissible as business records;
4) calculation sheets were admissible as admissions by a party
opponent; and 5) weight slips were admissible as adoptive admissions.

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