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■Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park and Open-Space Dist.-S159319

We address today a question of statutory interpretation, the answer to which will have a profound effect on how regional park and open space districts can manage their real property holdings.  The dispute in this case centers on a purported conflict between Public Resources Code[1] section 5565, which suggests real property is deemed “dedicated” for park or open space purposes at the moment of acquisition by a district, and section 5540, which suggests land is “actually dedicated” only after a district’s board of directors adopts a formal resolution for such purposes.  The difference is important because a district’s ability to sell or otherwise convey land “actually dedicated” under section 5540 is limited by substantial statutory restrictions.  The Court of Appeal below held that certain real property owned by defendant Riverside County Regional Park and Open-Space District (hereafter the Riverside District or the District) was — immediately upon acquisition — deemed by section 5565 “actually dedicated” for park or open space purposes within the meaning of section 5540, despite the absence of any affirmative action by the District’s board of directors so designating the property.  Accordingly, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the District’s proposed transfer of the land was subject to the restrictions set forth in section 5540.  Because the Court of Appeal misconstrued the interplay between sections 5540 and 5565, we reverse.

Facts

The Legislature first authorized the creation of regional park districts in 1933 “for the purpose of acquiring, improving, and maintaining parks, playgrounds, beaches, parkways, scenic drives, boulevards and other facilities for public recreation.”  (Stats. 1933, ch. 1043, p. 2664.)  This act was later codified in 1939 as section 5500 et seq. (Stats. 1939, ch. 94, p. 1217 et seq.) and then expanded in 1975 to include regional open space districts as well as combination use districts, called regional park and open space districts (§ 5500, as amended Stats. 1975, ch. 813, § 2, p. 1846).  Such districts now number eight in all and stretch from Los Angeles County in the south to Napa and Sonoma Counties in the north.[2]  The oldest and most developed district, and the one envisioned by the authors of the original legislation in 1933, is the East Bay Regional Park District.  Created in 1934, it spans Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and now encompasses 65 regional parks, over 97,000 acres of land, and over 1,000 miles of trails.  Five additional districts have been legislatively authorized but have yet to be created.  Today, existing regional park and/or open space districts in the state comprise several dozen regional parks and tens of thousands of acres of open space areas. 

The Legislature authorized the creation of the Riverside District in 1993.  (§ 5541.2.)  The enabling act provided the District “may plan, acquire, preserve, protect, and otherwise improve, extend, control, operate, and maintain open space areas, greenbelt areas, wildlife habitat areas, and regional parks for the use and enjoyment of all the inhabitants of the district.”  The same statute further provides the District “may select, designate, and acquire land, or rights in land, within or without the district, to be used and appropriated for those purposes.”  The District exercised these statutory powers in 1995, acquiring approximately 161 acres of land in the Wildomar area[3] of Riverside County from the Potter Family Trust.  Although the land’s appraised value was $1.37 million, the District paid only $950,000 for it and accepted the remaining $420,000 as a gift from the trust.  At issue in the present proceeding is an approximately 80-acre portion of this acquisition (hereafter referred to as the Wildomar property).  Although the District acquired and holds legal title to the Wildomar property, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors, which sits as the District’s board of directors (§ 5538.7), never adopted a resolution formally dedicating the property as a regional park, a regional open space, or a combination of a regional park and open space area.  All parties concede the Wildomar property consists of land “in an essentially unimproved state.”

In 2003, the District’s board of directors entered into an option agreement with the Mt. San Jacinto Community College District, agreeing to convey the Wildomar property to the college district for construction of a new community college campus.  The proposed sale of the Wildomar property was neither approved by the District’s voters nor by the state Legislature following a supermajority vote by the District’s board of directors.  Plaintiff Gerard Ste. Marie, a Wildomar and Riverside County resident, thereafter filed the petition for a peremptory writ of mandate that forms the basis of the present proceeding, contending the proposed conveyance of the Wildomar property would violate section 5540 and thus “there exists a real and immediate danger that [the District] will commit irreparable harm by conveying and disposing of the Wildomar property in direct contravention [of] the prohibitions of state law.” 

During the pendency of the trial court proceedings, the District unsuccessfully sought a joint resolution in the state Legislature that would have authorized the sale of the Wildomar property to the Mt. San Jacinto Community College District.  The trial court thereafter directed issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate, prohibiting sale of the Wildomar property until such time as the District complies with the requirements of section 5540; that is, until it obtains voter approval or legislative authorization for the sale.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we granted review.

■ Held:

Court of Appeals judgment is reversed where the "actual dedication" referred to in Public Resources Code sec. 5540 differs from the "dedication" referred to in sec. 5565, and legislative intent supports a finding that property is not deemed automatically dedicated for park or open space purposes upon acquisition by operation of sec. 5565. Instead, an interest in real property is actually dedicated under sec. 5540 when a resolution of dedication is formally adopted by the district's board of directors. Defendant's board of directors had not adopted a resolution actually dedicating the property in dispute for park or open space purposes, so the land was not subject to the restrictions on conveyance set forth in sec. 5540

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